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Abstract:
We look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age on retirement
expectations of workers in the Health and Retirement Study, aged 51 to 61 in 1992. For men, we find that
those whose marginal wage rate increased when the earnings test was repealed, had the largest increase in
the probability to work full-time past normal retirement age. We do not find significant evidence of effects
of the repeal of the earnings test on the probability to work past age 62 or the expected claiming age. On the
other hand, for those reaching the normal retirement age, deviations between the age at which Social Security
benefits are actually claimed and the previously reported expected age are more negative in 2000 than in
1998. Since our calculations show that the tax introduced by the earnings test was small when accounting for
actuarial benefit adjustments and differential mortality, our results suggest that although male workers form
expectations in a way consistent with forward-looking behavior, they misperceive the complicated rules of
the earnings test. Results for females suggest similar patterns but estimates are imprecise. 
Keywords: Social security earnings test, expectations, retirement, difference in differences, panel
data 
JEL codes: H55, J22 
Résumé:
Nous examinons l'effet de l’abrogation de l’évaluation des revenus au-delà  de l'âge normal de la retraite sur
les intentions de départ à la retraite des ouvriers âgés de 51 et 61 ans en 1992 dans l’enquête américaine du
« Health and Retirement Study ». Chez les hommes, nous constatons que ceux dont le salaire horaire marginal
a augmenté quand l'évaluation des revenus a été abrogée, ont enregistré la plus forte hausse de la probabilité
de continuer à travailler à temps plein au-delà de l’âge normal de la retraite. Nous ne trouvons pas d’effets
significatifs supportant que l'abrogation de l’évaluation des revenus ait entraîné une hausse de la probabilité
de continuer à travailler au-delà de l'âge de 62 ans ou à l'âge anticipé de la collecte de prestation des droits.
D'autre part, pour ceux qui atteignent l'âge normal de la retraite, les écarts entre l'âge auquel les prestations
de la sécurité sociale sont réclamées réellement et les intentions précédemment rapportées sont plus
importants en 2000 qu'en 1998. Puisque nos calculs démontrent que la taxe induite par l’évaluation du revenu
était modeste, dès que nous prenons en compte l’ajustement actuariel des prestations et le différentiel de
mortalité, nos résultats suggèrent que bien que les ouvriers de sexe masculin semblent former leurs
anticipations de façon apparemment rationnelle, ils perçoivent de façon erronée les règles compliquées du
système de l’évaluation des revenus. Chez les femmes, nos résultats suggèrent un comportement semblable
mais nos estimations sont imprécises.   2 
 
1.  Introduction 
  While several papers study the effect of the social security earnings test on actual 
retirement (e.g., Leonesio, 1990; Gruber and Orszag, 2003; Haider and Loughran, 2005), 
little  is  known  about  how  workers  in  their  late  fifties  or  early  sixties  adjust  their 
retirement plans and expectations in response to such an earnings test, which taxes away 
earnings  later  in  life.  The  Senior  Citizens’  Freedom  to  Work  Act  of  2000,  which 
eliminated the earnings test for workers aged 65 to 69, provides an excellent opportunity 
to look at this issue, involving a change in the effective tax structure across age groups.  
  Recent studies find significant responses to the earnings test in terms of labor 
supply,  claiming  of  benefits,  and  “bunching”  of  workers’  earnings  at  the  minimum 
exempt amount (Friedberg, 2000; Tran, 2004; Song, 2004; Haider and Loughran, 2005). 
This is surprising at first sight since benefits lost due to the earnings test are reimbursed 
at a later age through an actuarial adjustment. This adjustment is generally believed to be 
actuarially  fair  for  recent  cohorts.  One  interpretation  is  that  the  adjustment  is  be 
misunderstood (Benitez-Silva and Heiland, 2005). Another interpretation of these effects 
is that workers are myopic instead of forward looking. A necessary condition for workers 
to be forward-looking is that their expectations of future behavior respond to changes in 
the incentive structure over the life-cycle. If forward looking workers in their late fifties 
and early sixties are aware of the repeal of the earnings test, their expectations concerning 
future labor market behavior may change. They may also change their current behavior 
since, for example, maximizing lifetime utility implies intertemporal substitution of labor 
supply.  In  the  end,  the  consequences  of  the  earnings  test  depend  on  its  disincentive 
effects on lifetime labor supply and wealth.
3  
  This paper first documents the size of the taxes induced by the earnings test in the 
population covered by the Health and Retirement Study, using administrative earnings 
records from the Social Security Administration. These calculations take account of the 
actuarial adjustment and allow for differential mortality profiles exploiting heterogeneous 
subjective  survival  probabilities  elicited  in  the  HRS.  This  helps  gauge  how  big  the 
                                                 
3 Another consideration on the consequences and desirability of the earnings test is that its elimination may 
induce workers to retire “too early”, not taking into account the lower benefits level (Gruber and Orszag, 
2003). This could have damaging implications for poverty in old age.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2004)  
point to the fact that the elimination of the earnings test could affect the short-term viability of the Social 
Security Trust Fund. Mastrobuoni (2006) evaluates the elimination positively affected the long-term 
finances of the Trust Fund.   3 
disincentives  really  are,  and  whether  they  are  consistent  with  observed  behavioral 
responses  found  in  the  literature.  Second,  we  look  at  the  effect  of  the  repeal  of  the 
earnings test on expectations of workers not yet directly affected by the test in 2000. We 
consider the subjective probabilities to work full-time past ages 62 and 65, as well as the 
age at which workers expect to start collecting Social Security benefits. We also look at 
the extent to which workers later deviate from these expectations because of the repeal of 
the  earnings  test.  The  identification  strategy  makes  use  of  the  pre-repeal  tax  rates 
calculated in the first step to form groups affected differently by the repeal. We study 
whether  the  changes  in  expectations  around  the  time  of  the  repeal  vary  across  these 
groups.  
Section  2  discusses  the  functioning  of  the  earnings  test  and  how  it  affects 
behavior  according  to  theory.  Section  3  presents  the  data  and  evidence  on  the 
disincentives due to the earnings test. In section 4, we analyze the effect of eliminating 
the earnings test on expectations. In section 5 we look at deviations of actual outcomes 
from expectations. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Earnings Test and Its Potential Effects on Labor Supply 
  The parameters determining the earnings tests before and after the normal 
retirement age (NRA) are given in Table 1. The earnings test that was abolished in 2000 
concerns people above the NRA,
4 which was 65 years in 2000, but has been gradually 
increased since 2003. It was 65 years and 4 months for individuals turning 65 in 2004 and 
will be 65 years and 10 months for those reaching age 65 in 2007. The test applied until 
April 7 2000 to those who claimed benefits and had positive earnings.
5 Their OASI 
benefit was reduced by one dollar for every three dollars earned in excess of the exempt 
amount, which was $ 14,500 in 1998.
6  It is important to note that workers got 
                                                 
4 Social Security refers to the Normal Retirement Age as the Full Retirement Age (FRA).  
5 On April 7
th 2000, President Clinton signed the “Senior Citizen Freedom to Work Act”. Congress 
approved a preliminary version proposed on March 1
st and the Senate approved the amended version on 
March 22
nd. The desirability of the reform had already been emphasized in his 1999 State of the Union 
Address: "we should eliminate the limits on what seniors on Social Security can earn.". The vote was 
unanimous in the Senate in favor of the repeal. On March 23
rd, the passing of the measure in the Senate 
surfaced in popular media (New York Times, March 23
rd 2000). There was some discussion in the regular 
press about the upcoming reform. On February 20
th, the New York Times reports that the president already 
signaled his attention to sign the bill if passed which shows that there was little uncertainty about the 
possibility that the law would be in effect before the end of the year. The repeal was in effect for earnings 
after December 31
st 1999. 
6 In the year a worker reaches the normal retirement age, there is a special exemption for earnings in that 
calendar year. This exemption was $17,000 in 2000. See §1803.2 of the Social Security Handbook.    4 
compensated for not receiving OASI benefits in a given year by receiving more in the 
future. This is illustrated in the final row of Table 1 (DRC: delayed retirement credit). 
The compensation for postponing claiming in the years after NRA has increased over 
time. For those born prior to 1926, DRC was 3.5%. It was 7.0% in 2004 and will 
eventually reach 8% for future cohorts reaching NRA.  
An earnings test still applies for OASI benefits received before NRA (see Table 
1). If someone claims OASI benefits before reaching NRA, the OASI benefit is reduced 
by one US dollar of every two dollars earned above an exempt amount. The exempt 
amount grew from $7,440 per year in 1992 (the year of the first wave of HRS) up to 
$11,640 in 2004 in nominal terms. If individuals
7 postpone claiming for another year and 
have not yet reached the NRA, they get 6.8 percent (ARF, the actuarial reduction factor) 
higher benefits every year in the future than they would get if they started claiming 




A Two-Period Model 
   In a static model of labor supply, agents only look at the current period, and the 
actuarial compensation for reduced benefits in later years (the DRC) is ignored. Hence, 
the earnings test is akin to a means-tested benefit. In a dynamic framework, optimizing 
individuals will take the DRC into account when making their labor supply decisions, 
under the condition that they are aware of it. Whether the latter is indeed the case is not 
so clear. Friedberg (2000) argues that actual labor supply behavior reveals that 
individuals are not aware of the DRC.  Gruber and Orszag (2003) show that in one of the 
leading tax guides, no mention of the DRC is made.  
To understand the labor supply effects of the earnings test in a dynamic 
framework, we construct a simple two-period model along the lines of Disney and Smith 
                                                 
7 For couples, the situation is often more complicated, due to spouse benefits. For those collecting spouse 
benefits, the earnings test is applied on their spouse’s earnings. We ignore this issue in the current paper.  
8 For earnings lost before the NRA, the actuarial adjustment starts at the NRA. Each full monthly check 
lost gives rise to a one month actuarial adjustment. Hence someone who claims at age 62 and loses all his 
checks in that year because of high earnings, will receive the same check as someone who claimed at age 
63 from the point where they reach the NRA onwards. Before the NRA however, the one who claimed 
early (and lost his first year benefit), will get checks from age 63 to the NRA that do not include the 
actuarial adjustment.  
   5 
(2001). The static model and the model in which people are not aware of the delayed 
retirement credit will be captured as special cases.   
For simplicity, assume individuals make decisions over two periods. In period 1, 
they can decide to claim OASI benefits or not, and can also choose hours of work h. In 
period 2, individuals claim (irrespective of whether claiming in period 1 or not) and do 
not work. The hourly wage rate in the first period is denoted by w. If claiming already in 
period 1, the individual gets pension 1 P  in period 1 and 2
c P  in period 2. Let 2 2 1
n c P P P δ = +  
be the benefit if the individual delays claiming to period 2. The actuarial adjustment 
factor is  0 δ ≥ . Individuals discount period 2 income at a rate  0 θ ≥  (which incorporates 
mortality risk). Hence, the adjustment is perceived as unfavorable if  1/ δ θ < ,  in which 
case income  1 P  in the first period is preferred to  1 P δ  in the second period. The case of a 
myopic individual is represented by  0 θ = .  




n Y wh P θ = +   (1) 
If the individual decides to claim and work in the first period, income can be affected by 
the earnings test. The earnings test rule is defined by two parameters: the exempt amount 
E (the maximum earnings allowed without being taxed) E (the exempt amount) and the 
“tax rate” τ (the  rate at which benefits are taxed away by the earnings test for each dollar 
above E). Three situations can occur depending on how many hours the individual 
decides to work. If  / h E w < , the earnings test does not reduce benefits, and the present 
value of total income is 
  1 2
c Y wh P P θ = + +   (2) 
If hours are above the threshold (or, in other words, earnings are above E), benefits are 
reduced. The reduction is  ( ) e wh E τ = − up to complete exhaustion of the benefit 1 P . 
Exhaustion will occur when  0 e P = , i.e., when hours worked are given by: 
  max 1 ( / )/ h P E w τ = + . 
If the benefit is completely lost, the individual gets  2 2 1
n c P P P δ = +  in the second period, 
the same as if he would not have claimed. Define  1 / e P π = , the fraction of the benefit lost 
in period 1. If benefits are partly taxed away, the benefit in the second period 
                                                 
9 We abstract from other taxes such as federal and state income taxes.   6 
is 2 1
c P P πδ + . SSA calculates the partial adjustments based on the number of months  
checks were not collected. On the segment  / h E w ≥  and  max h h < , the present value of 
total  income over the two periods is thus given by 
  2 2 1 ( ( )) ( )
c c Y wh P wh E P P τ θ πδ = + − − + +   (3) 
Finally, an individual who works more than  max h  gets 
  2
n Y wh P θ = + .  (4) 
Note that (1) and (4) are equivalent in the case where working hours are so high 
that all benefits are exhausted. This would not be true if there was no actuarial adjustment 
under the earnings test. In that case, we would essentially have  0 π =  instead of 1 / e P π = . 
This will also be the relevant case for individuals who realize that they get a 
compensation for postponing claiming ( 0 δ > ) but do not realize that they are 
compensated in the same way if they have started to claim but their benefits are partially 
or completely taxed away by the earnings test; such individuals will base their decisions 
on the perception that π equals zero. 
For individuals who do not intend to work in period 1 or want to work few hours 
such that their earnings are below E, it may still be profitable to delay claiming rather 
than to claim immediately. This is the case if the actuarial adjustment  1 P δ  is large enough 
to compensate for the lost benefits 1 P . In this two period model, the condition for this 
is 1/ δ θ > , i.e., the individual perceives the compensation for delayed claiming as more 
than fair.  
To illustrate how expected income is affected by the earnings test, we consider the 
example in Figure 1, based upon the parameter values 
  1 2 20,  14,500,  0.75, 0.33,  0.97,  10,000
c w E P P δ τ θ = = = = = = =  
Since in this example  1/ δ θ < , the individual considers the DRC as actuarially 
less than fair and will not postpone claiming if the earnings test does not apply. We 
consider two situations with claiming in period 1. One is the actual situation where 
adjustment due to the earnings test is possible ( 0 π > ) and the other one is the situation 
where the individual is unaware of the adjustment in case the earnings test applies (and 
uses  0 π =  in making his decisions). 
Figure 1 presents this individual’s “budget set”, i.e., the present value of 
perceived total income as a function of hours of leisure (3000-hours of work) in period 1.   7 
If the individual does not claim in period 1 (dashed line), the budget set is linear 
(progressive federal taxes are ignored in this stylized model). In the other two cases, the 
budget set is piecewise linear, with kinks at  min / h E w =  (= 725, i.e., 2275 hours of 
leisure) and  max min 1 /( ) 2225 h h P w τ = + = (775 hours of leisure). The slopes of the flatter 
part in the middle, however, are quite different. If  0 π = , the slope is (1 )w τ − (=13.33), 
since the individual perceives no compensation for the benefits that are taxed away. In 
this case, the individual may easily think that it is better not to claim. In the actual 
situation on the other hand, where 1 / e P π = , the slope is higher (13.33 18.18 w θδτ + = ), 
because of the actuarial adjustment. The difference with the slope of w(=20) is due to the 
fact that the individual’s subjective discount rate makes the actuarial adjustment unfair, 
so that the delayed receipt of benefits is still seen as a mild tax on earnings.  
Abolishing the earnings test can have different effects on labor supply period 1, 
depending on where the individual would be on the budget curve in the presence of the 
earnings test and depending on whether or not he claims in the first period. 
First consider someone who is claiming benefits in the presence of the earnings 
test, and works more than  max h hours (group A). Abolishing the earnings test does not 
change the marginal wage rate but has a negative income effect. Hence, the repeal is 
expected to reduce the work effort.  
Next consider the group claiming benefits and working between  min / h E w =  and 
max h in the presence of the earnings test (group B). This group has some benefits taxed 
away by the earnings test and face both a substitution and an income effect from the 
repeal. With no earnings test, the worker gets higher income, reducing hours worked 
(income effect) but also a higher marginal reward from additional working hours, leading 
to an increase in labor supply (substitution effect). The total effect is ambiguous.  
Individuals just above or exactly at the kink  min h  will want to work if the earnings 
test is eliminated, since for them, there is hardly any income effect. The income effect 
will be larger if the individual is closer to max h . We thus expect a positive effect on labor 
supply for those close to or at min h , and a smaller positive or even negative effect for those 
close to max h . In our empirical work, we will exploit information from SSA earnings   8 
records to determine where individuals are before the earnings test is repealed and how 
close the respondents actually are to the two kinks. 
For the group who claim benefits in period 1 and work less than  min h (group C), 
the earnings test is irrelevant – their earnings are so low that the earnings test does not 
reduce their benefits. Their behavior will not change if the earnings test is abolished.
10  
Finally, consider the respondents who do not claim benefits as long as the 
earnings test applies because they see the actuarial adjustment as favorable. For this 
group (group D), the repeal has no effect – they will also not claim if the earnings test is 
eliminated. 
A second group of non-claimants are those who perceive the actuarial adjustment 
as unfavorable ( 1/ δ θ < ) but misinterpret the rules of the earnings test and perceive 
0 π =  (group E). Their perceived budget set in case of claiming will changes with the 
repeal, and this may induce them to start claiming. In figure 1, these are the people on the 
dashed line who work more than (approximately) 1200 hours – for them, as long as the 
earnings test applies, the present value of total income is perceived as higher if they do 
not claim. This changes if the earnings test is abolished. They will then claim and reduce 
their working hours due to a negative income effect.    
 
3. Data 
We use all available cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the 
waves 1992 - 2004. Table 2 presents the design of the HRS, illustrating when respondents 
were interviewed and how old they were at the time of the repeal. The original HRS 
cohort born 1931-1941 was first interviewed in 1992, the AHEAD cohort born before 
1923 entered in 1993, the War Babies (born 1942-1947) and Child of Depression Age 
(CODA, born 1924-1930) entered in 1998, and the Early Boomers (EB, born 1948-1953) 
first participated in 2004, the last available wave. The cohort directly affected by the 
repeal is the original HRS cohort, for whom the normal retirement age was 65. When the 
earnings test was repealed in 2000, respondents of this cohort were between 59 and 69 
years old. Their delayed retirement credit varies from 5.0% to 7.5%). Although the NRA 
of War Babies and some HRS respondents respondents is after the year of the repeal, 
                                                 
10 In practice, measurement error or rigidities may imply that respondents are observed below the kink but 
actually are at the kink. In that case, abolishing the earnings test will have a positive effect on their labor 
supply (as in group B).   9 
expectations of these younger workers can be affected by the repeal. They face a more 
favorable delayed retirement than their predecessors, however.     
 
3.1 Match with Social Security Earnings Records and Sample Selection 
In order to obtain exact information on OASI entitlements and how these are 
affected by earnings and claiming decisions, we link respondent records with their Social 
Security earnings history records. Thus we can accurately compute social security 
incentives faced by respondents and avoid measurement errors, which can be an 
important source of bias (see Haider and Loughran, 2005). We use administrative 
earnings records to compute benefit eligibility as well as the earnings profile. We have 
access to records for the HRS, War Babies and CODA cohorts.
11  
There are two potential drawbacks of using earnings record matched with HRS 
respondents. First, Social Security earnings are top-coded at the maximum taxable 
earnings (presently about $90,000). This applies to 6% of respondents in 1991 (HRS) and 
1999 (for WarBabies and CODA). Respondents subject to the earnings test have lost their 
complete social security benefits before reaching the threshold of $90,000. Hence, the 
classification of respondents in terms of the incentive they face due to the earnings test is 
not affected by the censoring – all censored respondents are in group A. 
Second, there is a fair number of respondents for whom a match to an SSA 
earnings record is not possible. In the HRS cohort, 75.1% of respondents have a 
successful match. For CODA and War Babies respondents, the match rates are much 
lower (50-60%). We will present some descriptive statistics for the two groups (those 
with and those without a match; see Table 4 below). This will show that in terms of 
observables the two samples do not differ much. 
We use the Average National Wage Index constructed by the Social Security 
Administration to project earnings into the future. These earnings are needed to compute 
various measures of future retirement incentives. Over the period 1985-2003, the average 
growth rate was roughly 4%. Over the same period, inflation (measured by the Consumer 
                                                 
11 The HRS asked respondents in 1992, 1998, and 2004 for permission to match their earnings records. We 
do not have access to the earnings records data for 2004.  Hence, we have no Social Security earnings data 
for the Early Boomers.   10 
Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) was on average 2.9% per year, 
thus yielding an about 1% real growth in earnings.
12  
For our analysis, we select an unbalanced sample of respondents aged 51 to 61 
who report to be working for pay. We do this because the expectations questions we will 
examine are only asked to workers. In 1992, the entire original HRS cohort is age 
eligible, but this is not the case in later waves. Some respondents aged 51-61 have 
already retired, but this number is low compared to after age 61 when workers become 
eligible for Social Security benefits on their own earnings record. The first major 
refreshment of the original HRS sample is the War Babies cohort, aged 51-56 when 
entering in 1998.
13  
Table 3 gives the number of observations in each wave along with the number of 
observations for which we have Social Security Earnings Records (SS.Er). The sample 
generally gets smaller after 2000 until the new cohort of Early Boomers comes in. The 
fraction of respondents with an SS.Er is large in early years and decreases because of 
lower match rates for War Babies in 1998. The low match rate in 2004 reflects the fact 
that we do not have any SS.Er for the Early Boomers. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of some background variables that we shall 
use in the analysis of expectations in the age 51-61 sample.  One potentially important job 
characteristic is the flexibility of the current job. If workers cannot change hours at their 
current employer, they need to change jobs to reduce hours (see, e.g., Hurd, 1996). This 
may be difficult, particularly for workers in their late 60s because demand for workers of 
this age may be lower and search costs may be higher. Some information on job 
flexibility is available in the HRS as of 1996. We use two questions, for which the 
response rate is quite high (above 90%). The first question refers to whether the 
respondent feels pressured by co-workers to retire before 65. This is used to measure the 
general attitude of co-workers (and often employers) to older workers. The other question 
refers to whether the respondent thinks that a transition to a low demanding job is 
                                                 
12 The assumptions made for the projections are that workers keep working their current hours, and that the 
growth rate of wages is the same across all groups of workers. Neither of these assumptions is completely 
correct. We do not forecast earnings at an individual level, since this leads to selection issues due to 
retirement incentives. 
13 The Early Boomers refresh the sample in 2004. For most of the analysis, we will not use the Early 
Boomers because we do not have their Social Security earnings records.   11 
relatively easy at the current employer. This measures the flexibility to reduce work 
pressure, hours, or responsibilities in the current job. We code the answers as one (yes) if 
the respondent reports either “strongly agree” or “agree” and zero (no) otherwise. Over 
all waves, approximately one tenth of workers aged 51-61 think they are pressured to 
retire before 65 at their current employer. More than one quarter think that a transition to 
a low demanding job with the same employer is possible. 
  Table 4 also includes measures of current earnings, accumulated financial wealth 
(liquid = savings, stocks, bonds, CDs, IRAs) and non-financial assets such as real estate, 
and whether the respondent has an occupational pension on the current job and, if so, of 
what type - defined benefit or defined contribution. AIME is Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings, a measure of life-time earnings, computed using the SS.Er earnings records. It 
is the monthly equivalent of the average earnings over the 35 years of highest admissible 
Social Security earnings. It is the basis for the primary insurance amount (PIA), the 
benefit to which a worker is entitled at the normal retirement age.
14 The median worker 
aged 51-61 had an AIME of $1578 in 1994, compared to $2237 in 2002.
15  
Differences in characteristics between the overall sample and the sample with 
matched SS.Er earnings records appear to be small, except for 2004 where the entire 
Early Boomers cohort does not have a match. Apart from this difference, some under 
representation of blacks is found, as well some difference in total financial wealth.   
We focus on three measures of expectations. The first one is the subjective 
probability to work full-time in any period past age 65. This measure is relatively well 
documented, see, e.g., Hurd (1999) and Chan and Stevens (2004).
16 We refer to this 
question as P(65). The question is only asked when the respondent provided a positive 
probability to another probability question, asking the probability of working full-time 
past age 62. If the answer to this question (P(62)) is zero, P(65) is assigned a value of 
zero as well. Respondents are not asked P(62) and P(65) if they are 62 or older.
17 We will 
focus on the effect of the repeal of the earnings test after NRA on P(65), but will also 
consider its potential effects on P(62), since it may be the case that respondents who 
                                                 
14 The PIA is a piece-wise linear function of the AIME with two kink points and marginal tax rates of 0.9, 
0.4 and 0.1 on the three segments. 
15 These amounts are not adjusted for inflation (using the CPI $1578 in 1994 dollars is $1916 in 2002 
dollars). 
16 The exact wording of the question is “Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what 
do you think are the chances that you will be working full-time after you reach 65”. The answer is a 
number between 0 and 100 (in 1992 between 0 and 10 which is recoded). 
17 There are some exceptions due to routing inconsistencies.   12 
change their mind about working at age 65 are more likely to keep working between age 
62 and age 65, due to the costs of labor force exit and entry.  
The third expectations question we consider is the expected age at which 
respondents expect to claim Social Security benefits. We will denote this variable as EC. 
Values are missing for respondents who reported they did not anticipate receiving any 
Social Security benefits. There is a fair amount of don’t knows as well. Overall, the value 
is missing for 19-24% of the respondents in our sample (varying across waves). Note that 
EC is just a point estimate, if respondents are uncertain it may be the most likely age at 
which they think they can start claiming, or the median or mean of their subjective 
distribution. Thus the information in this point estimate is more ambiguous than the 
information in the probability questions P(62) and P(65) (cf. Manski, 2004). Furthermore, 
rounded ages of claiming probably eliminate some of the important variation to the 
earnings test, particularly if the response is small (say a couple of months). 
Table 5 shows the evolution of P(65) and EC over time. Answers to P(65) and EC 
show an upward trend over time in this sample. Of course, we do not know if this is a 
true time effect because the composition of the sample changes over waves. This is a 
consequence of the age restriction - only respondents younger than 62. This age 
restriction is needed for P(62) and P(65) because these questions are not asked after that, 
and is also used for the expected claiming age to avoid dealing with the sample selection 
problem introduced by those who start claiming from age 62.  
 
3.3. Incentive Measures from the Earnings Test 
For respondents with a match, we calculate social security benefits and potential loss 
due to the earnings test.  From these we can calculate various measures of social security 
wealth that involve the effect of the earnings test at the early retirement age (62) and the 
normal retirement age (65 or 66). We consider three such measures: 
 
Myopic loss: In a year in which the earnings test applies, the loss is given by 
  1 max(min( [ ], ),0),   , k k k e wh E P k ERA NRA τ = − =   (5) 
It is the loss in benefit that the worker incurs at age k if he earns wh at age k.
18  
                                                 
18 We calculate the gross loss due to the earnings test ignoring taxation issues, which will give an upper 
bound of the loss after tax. Progressivity in Taxation can also have a labor supply effect because the   13 
 
Forward-Looking Loss according to Life-Table Survival Probabilities: This measure 
is the sum of the myopic loss and the gain arising from the actuarial adjustment (DRC) 
compared to a situation where there is no earnings test:  
 
1
, , , ( ) ( )
A s k
L k k L k k k k s s k f e S s P θ π δ
− +
= = −∑   (6) 
where  , ( ) L k S s represents the life-table probability of living to age s given survival up to 
age k. The terminal age A is set such that  , ( ) 0 L k S A ≈  (here A=109).  , k s P  is the pension 
someone gets at age s from claiming at age k. 
 
Forward-Looking Loss according to Subjective Survival Probabilities: As discussed 
by Tran (2004), the actuarial adjustment may be fair for some but not for others who have 
lower life expectancy. This is particularly important in the case of the earnings test since 
individuals who are at the kink (the point where the earnings test kicks in), are likely to 
have lower socio-economic status and health than those higher in the earnings 
distribution. One reason why the earnings test might have an effect on those workers is 
that the actuarial adjustment is relatively unfair for them because of their low survival 
probabilities. We therefore also consider a forward-looking loss measure that takes 
account of the dispersion in survival probabilities in the population. Delavande and 
Rohwedder (2006) find that the heterogeneity in subjective probabilities proxies very 
closely the variation in true survival probabilities in the HRS/AHEAD panel. We 
therefore construct a set of average subjective probabilities  , ( ) j k S s for groups of 
respondents characterized by health, education, gender and age (see Appendix A for 




, , ( ) ( )
A s k
j k k j k k k k s k f e S s P θ π δ
− +
= = −∑ .  (7) 
For forward looking measures, we use a real discount rate of 3% (i.e.,  0.97 θ = ). 
We use a 2.9% inflation rate in our forecast and thus a nominal discount rate of 5.9%.  
                                                                                                                                                 
marginal tax rate changes as a result of the elimination of the earnings test. However, the degree of 
progressivity in the U.S. tax system is not pronounced. 
19 Note that (6) and (7) are not exactly correct in the case where we evaluate the loss at the early retirement 
age. In that case, the actuarial adjustment only kicks in once the worker reaches the NRA. One way to 
incorporate that is to define 
, ( )
ERA s ERA I s NRA π π = ≥  so that the actuarial adjustment in the earnings test 
operates only after the NRA.  
   14 
Social security benefits are based on projected AIME from ages 62 and 69. We 
use the formula in effect during the period covered by the data. Appendix B gives details 
on the construction of benefits. We do not take account of spouse benefits. The earnings 
test also applies to the spouse benefit but it depends on both spouses earnings. This 
omission is likely more important for females than males.  
We first describe patterns of expected social security wealth assuming workers 
retire when they claim Social Security benefits. This helps understand the heterogeneity 
in the actuarial adjustment which workers face when they consider claiming benefits. We 
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Here  , k s P  is the annual projected social security benefit at age s if the respondent starts 













= =   (14) 
Similarly, we compute accrual rates  , j k A  using subjective mortality rates instead of life 
tables. Because workers differ in terms of their potential benefits, earnings history, birth 
cohort (determining many benefit rule parameters), and life expectancy (in the subjective 
case), there is considerable variation in the accruals. 
Table 6 presents Expected Social security wealth at age 62, the early retirement 





th quantile of workers aged 51-61 and the 
ratios of other quantiles to the median. It also presents the distribution of accruals defined 
in equation (14). It uses both life-table and subjective probabilities. 
Using life-table probabilities, median expected social security wealth at age 62 is 
$148,000. There is considerable variance, with the 10
th quantile expecting $58,000 and 
the 90
th quantile expecting $228,000. The variance is still larger when subjective survival 
rates are used. The median using subjective survival probabilities is slightly lower 
($147,000), reflecting pessimism in the subjective survival probabilities, on average. 
Social Security accruals are generally positive at the median until age 65 where 
for some workers, the DRC may not be sufficient to compensate for increased mortality 
risk. There is also considerable heterogeneity in accruals. At age 65, half of the sample   15 
has negative and the other half has positive accruals. Accruals tend to be lower using 
subjective probabilities because these imply higher mortality risk than the life tables.   
Table 7 presents the loss (or gain) due to the earnings test using the myopic loss k e  
and the forward-looking measures using life-table survival probabilities  , L k f  and 
subjective survival probabilities , j k f . These losses are reported in dollars, as a fraction of 
earnings, and as a fraction of liquid financial assets (as a measure of liquidity 
constraints).  The myopic loss is larger at age 62 than at the NRA, due to a higher exempt 
amount and a lower marginal tax rate at the NRA. The heterogeneity in myopic tax rates 
is largely due to differences in projected earnings and benefit entitlements.  
Because of actuarial adjustments, the forward looking tax is much lower than the 
myopic rate. Of course, if the actuarial adjustment was completely fair, the tax would be 
zero. Whether it is perceived as fair depends on the “true” discount rates that individuals 
use. Additional heterogeneity is introduced when computing these forward-looking taxes, 
e.g. since they vary by birth cohort (due to different actuarial adjustment). The subjective 
forward-looking tax measure is somewhat higher for females than for males, since 
females underpredict their probability to live up to age 75.  
Since one interpretation why workers might prefer to claim and be subject to the 
earnings test is that they are liquidity constrained, we express the taxes also as a fraction 
of current liquid wealth. This shows that for a substantial fraction of workers (with low 
financial wealth), the tax represents a large fraction of their liquid wealth.  
The mean forward looking tax rate (as fraction of earnings) is very close to zero 
for younger workers. About 90% of workers in the age 51-61 sample face a tax lower 
than $5000 on life-time Social Security wealth. Expressed as a fraction of earnings or 
financial wealth, the tax imposed by the earnings test is therefore not large. Hence, if 
workers perceive the rules correctly, we should not expect large labor supply effects of 
the repeal. This is particularly true for later cohorts, for whom the rate of actuarial 
adjustment is larger. 
 
5. The Effect of the Repeal on Expectations and Deviations from Expectations 
 
5.1 The Effect on Expectations 
   16 
As explained in Section 2, workers with different expected loss due to the 
earnings test are predicted to react differently to the repeal. This is the case if workers are 
not aware of the actuarial adjustment compensating for benefits lost due to the earnings 
test, or, to a lesser extent, to workers who perceive the actuarial adjustment as actuarially 
unfair. This suggests that we can use a difference-in-difference approach by grouping 
workers according to the pre-repeal incentives they faced as a consequence of the 
earnings test. The key to this identification strategy is the determination of the groups that 
get different treatments. We define the groups based on the percentage of social security 
benefits predicted to be lost at the normal retirement age (NRA).  
For example, those who were not expected to be affected by the repeal, i.e. had no 
loss due to the earnings test, are not likely to react to its repeal. This concerns everyone 
with earnings below the exempt amount. On the other hand, those who earn exactly the 
exempt amount or somewhat more should react to the repeal - it will increase the 
marginal return to working more hours, and we therefore expect them to get a higher 
probability to work full-time past age 65. For the group who earn substantially more than 
the exempt for whom a high share of their benefit but not everything is taxed away, the 
same substitution effect applies, but this is more likely to be compensated by an income 
effect: eliminating the earnings test will not only change their marginal wage but also 
bring them to a higher indifference curve. This effect will become larger the higher the 
amount of benefit which was lost under the earnings test. Hence, for the group that has a 
substantial fraction taxed away, the total effect is unknown. Finally, for the group for 
whom all benefits are taxed away under the earnings test, there will be no substitution 
effect but only a (probably negative) income effect, and one would expect a negative 
effect of eliminating the earnings test on the probability to work past 65. 
We thus define groups in the following way: 
1.  No benefit lost: Projected earnings below 80% of the exempt amount, 
2.  1% to 49% of benefit lost 
3.  50% to 99% of benefit lost 
4.  100% of benefit lost 
 
Denote by  , 1,2,3,4 c g c = ,  the indicators that take value 1 when the respondent is in one 
of these four groups. We use 1998 as the year to define the grouping since it is the wave   17 
preceding the repeal. Define a variable  t REP  that takes value 1 for observations after the 
repeal in 2000. Since job characteristics are only observed from 1996 onwards, and we 
cannot use the cohort of “Early boomers” in 2004, and we are left with the time widow 
1996-2002.  
  We first consider the respondents who report a non-missing expectation in waves 
1998 and 2002. The idea is to look for a differential change between the two waves 
across groups. Composition effects cannot occur because we consider the same 
respondents in both waves. The identifying assumption is that all groups would have 
similar trends in expectations if there were no repeal. Table 8 reports mean expectations 
in both waves for each group, separately for males (left hand panel) and females (right 
hand panel). 
  For males, the results for P(65), the probability to work full-time at any point in 
time after reaching age 65, are in line with what the theory discussed above predicts. 
Respondents for whom the earnings test was not binding (group 1) hardly change their 
average P(65), and the fraction with nonzero P(65) does not change much either. This 
suggests that there is not much of a trend in P(65). For group 2, the group for which we 
predicted the largest positive effect, we indeed find a substantial increase in the average 
value of the probability to work full-time after the normal retirement age of 65 years, and 
we also find a substantial increase in the fraction reporting that this probability is nonzero 
after the repeal. Taking group 1 as the control group (the group with no treatment), the 
difference in differences estimators are 2.98%-points for the increase in the average P(65) 
and 7.75%-points for the increase in the percentage of male workers with nonzero P(65). 
For group 3, we find positive but smaller effects, in line with theory – here the positive 
substitution effect is partly cancelled by a negative income effect. Finally, for group 4, 
we do not find much of an effect. We would have expected to find a negative income 
effect here, but their change in P(65) is actually somewhat larger than that for the control 
group instead of smaller. For these workers, Social Security benefits may actually 
represent a small share of their total wealth. 
  For female workers, the effects are quite different. All groups have positive 
changes, including the control group, suggesting a positive trend in the probability to 
work full-time past age 65 for these cohorts. The three groups that are affected by the 
earnings test (and its elimination) all show larger positive effects than the control group, 
implying that elimination of the earnings test will have a positive effect on labor supply.   18 
In contrast to the theoretical prediction and the results for men, however, the effect is 
small for group 2 and larger for groups 3 and 4.    
In the bottom panel of Table 8, we consider the expected age at which 
respondents think they will start claiming old age social security benefits. If people would 
think they are heavily taxed by the earnings test (ignoring or downgrading the 
compensation in the form of actuarial adjustment), but would realize that claiming later 
leads to higher benefits, we would expect that abolishing the earnings test has positive 
effects on the probability to claim at (or before) the normal retirement age. These effects 
should be largest for the people who are taxed most, i.e., for groups 3 and 4. On the other 
hand, if labor supply increases due to elimination of the earnings test, people will be less 
in need of immediate benefits and will tend to postpone claiming. This gives a negative 
effect on the probability to claim at NRA, particularly for group 2 and to a lesser extent 
for group 3. The results show that for all groups the probability to postpone claiming till 
after NRA rises over time, but the change is largest for group 1, the group that is 
unaffected by the earnings test. Thus abolishing the earnings test seems to make people 
claim earlier, in line with the first effect discussed above – their earnings are no longer 
taxed away. The differences between the three groups, however, are not in line with the 
theoretical arguments, neither for men nor for women. 
  An alternative interpretation would be that many workers also do not understand 
the negative consequences of early claiming for their future benefits level. Many workers 
will simply anticipate that they will start claiming when they stop working. Again, 
however, this is not in line with the results – we would then expect the largest positive 
effect on the probability to postpone claiming for group 2, the group with the largest 
positive effect on labor supply after NRA.     
  The difference in differences estimator only consider the balanced sample of 
individuals who work and answer the expectations questions both in 1998 and 2002. In 
order to exploit the complete unbalanced sample, we formulate a model that also controls 
for several background characteristics.  
  We observe for each individual i in wave  1,..., i t T = , the subjective probability to 
work past age 65,  it p , and the age at which respondents expect to claim benefits  it e . We 
model  it p with a two-limit tobit equation, accounting for the substantial number of zeros 
and 100 in the observed answers:    19 
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  We consider two specifications, one where the  it u are assumed to be independent 
over time (pooled tobit) and one where the  it u are equi-correlated, i.e., are the sum of an 
error term which is assumed to be independent over time, and an individual effect which 
remains the same over time. 
  We include dummies for three of the four groups to capture differences between 
groups that remain constant over time, and time dummies to capture the trend relevant for 
all groups. (These variables were also included in the model which implicitly was behind 
the difference in difference estimates presented in Table 8). We also incorporate a 
number of background characteristics, some constant over time (race and education), 
others time varying (health, job characteristics, pension entitlements, household wealth).   
The left hand panels of Tables 9a and 9b report the estimates of the parameters of 
main interest, the interactions ( c ξ ) which measure the differential effect of elimination of 
the earnings test for each of the four groups. The complete two-limit tobit results (and the 
details on which background variables are included) are presented in the appendix C. 
  There are some differences in size of coefficients between the two columns, but 
qualitative conclusions are largely similar. The findings for men are largely in line with 
the difference in differences estimates in Table 8. We find results in accordance with 
theory – the largest positive effects of eliminating the earnings test are found for those 
whose marginal wage increases, a positive substitution effect. Unlike in Table 8, 
however, there is no evidence that an income effect in the opposite direction would 
reduce the total change for those with a substantial income gain (group 3). The estimated 
effect for group 3 is actually somewhat larger than that for group 2, though not 
significantly so. Evidence of an income effect is also not apparent from group 4 – its 
reaction to the elimination is not significantly different from that of the control group.  
  For women, the sign and ordering of the effects are in line with theory, with group 
2 having the largest positive (substitution) effect, a smaller positive effect for group 3,   20 
and a negative (income) effect for group 4. None of these effects are statistically 
significant, however. 
  In column 3, we consider the binary event whether a worker reports a positive or a 
zero probability to work full-time after age 65. A random effects probit model is used, 
with a specification that is otherwise the same as the random effects tobit model in the 
second column. The results for men are more in line with the theory than those for the 
tobit models, in the sense that group 2 now is affected most by elimination of the 
earnings test. The effect for group 3 is positive also, but smaller and not significant. We 
also consider a fixed effect model using a conditional logit. In that case, we rely on 
comparisons of sequences of expectations with some transitions. The identification 
comes from the comparison within sequences with an equal number of waves with 
positive expectations. For men, the results are similar to the random effect results 
suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is not important for our previous conclusion. 
For women, the random effect results are qualitatively similar to those for the tobit 
models. The effects have the sign and ranking predicted by theory, but none of them is 
significant. For females, the fixed effect results for group 1 one is close to significant and 
larger than that of other groups. This suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is perhaps 
more important for females although results remain insignificant. 
  We also considered P(62), the probability of working past age 62. We have 
estimated the same models for this as for P(65), but found that the repeal of the earnings 
test had a small and insignificant effect for all groups. See the Appendix for the results.
20 
This is understandable – although there are reasons why there could be indirect labor 
supply effects of the earnings test on P(62), the effects are likely to be smaller than those 
on P(65) where within period is immediately affected. The fact that we do not find 
evidence of these effects could be seen as evidence against intertemporal substitution or 
life-cycle optimization, but it could also just mean that these indirect effects are too small 
to be significant in the available sample.  
  Columns 4 and 5 of Tables 9a and 9b present the estimates of the effect of 
elimination of the earnings test on the expected claiming age. Column 4 presents the 
results of a random effects ordered probit model, distinguishing three cases: claiming 
before NRA, claiming at NRA, or claiming after NRA. A positive coefficient indicates 
that the probability to claim before NRA falls while the probability to claim after NRA 
                                                 
20 The fixed effect results are not shown but have the same negative conclusion.   21 
rises (the effect on claiming at NRA is ambiguous). In column 5, no distinction is made 
between claiming before or at the normal retirement age, and a random effects probit 
model is estimated. The right hand sides of the ordered probit and probit models are 
specified in the same way as in the models for P(65).    
  In line with the results in Table 8, the parameter estimates are small, and we do 
not find significant effects on the expected claiming age
21. Only if the three groups that 
are affected by the earnings test are merged (top panel of the table), we find marginally 
significant effect for men and a significant effect in the ordered probit for women, but the 
signs of the effects are opposite in the ordered probit and the probit model.  
 
5.2 Deviations from Expectations 
 
In the previous section we found that the repeal of the earnings test after NRA has 
had an effect on the probability that male respondents will work after age 65, but we 
found no evidence on an effect on the expected claiming age. One possible explanation 
for the latter might be that respondents report their most likely retirement age and the 
effect of the repeal may not be large enough to change this, even though the repeal does 
have an effect on the probability distribution. In this sense, the expected claiming age is 
not so informative. In this section we look at the realized claiming age, which does not 
suffer from the same problem – it is a realization, not a forecast. We consider two 
indicators of actual claiming decisions: whether someone claims when reaching NRA (or 
earlier), and the difference between the age when someone starts claiming and the last 
available forecast (given at age 61 or earlier).   
  For the actual decisions when respondents start claiming Social Security benefits, 
we select the survey years 1998 and 2000 and look at respondents who reach NRA 
between these two waves, who have not yet claimed Social Security benefits in 1998, and 
who will eventually claim prior to age 70.
22  
Table 10 presents the results. The number of respondents who claim immediately 
after reaching NRA increases with the repeal of the earnings test. The increase is 
                                                 
21 Fixed effect results were qualitatively similar and are not reported. 
22 For those reaching the NRA in 2000, we observe whether they claim at age 69 or earlier in  the 2004 
wave. Hence, to avoid problems of right-censoring, we select the sample of those who will actually claim 
between 65 and 69 years old. We consider 2000 rather than the 2002 interview because of this censoring 
issue. In 1996, very few respondents have reached the NRA. Only the oldest of the original cohort (age 61 
in 1992). This is why we start in 1998.   22 
substantial for men (13.7%-points), and smaller for women (3.7%-points). On the other 
hand, as we saw earlier, the expected claiming age does not show the same reaction to the 
repeal. As a consequence, we find that the average difference between actual and 
expected claiming age has become negative in 2000, while it was almost zero in 1998, for 
both men and women. 
  The bottom panel distinguishes the same four groups as before, on the basis of 
how much their earnings are taxed while the earnings test is still in place. Men and 
women have been merged to increase sample size. Still, sample size is quite small and the 
results should be interpreted with some care – differences are not statistically significant 
at the usual levels. Still, the results suggest that particularly those who were most affected 
by the earnings test decide to claim earlier after the earnings test is repealed. The groups 
with tax rates higher than 50% are the groups for which the difference between actual and 
expected claiming age is less (i.e., less positive or more negative) in 2000 than in 1998. 
The increase in the fraction of people claiming immediately after NRA is largest for the 
group with the highest tax on their SS benefits under the earnings test (27%-points), and 
the differences are also positive but smaller for the other groups who are taxed. 
  While suffering from small sample size, all these results thus point in the same 
direction: the repeal of the earnings has induced a change in actual claiming behavior that 
is in line with economic theory – more people claim immediately upon reaching NRA, 
because their benefits are no longer taxed by the earnings test. This leaves us with the 
question why we do not find an effect on expected claiming age, while the results for 
P(65) suggest that (male) respondents do adjust their expected labor supply behavior. A 
possible answer is that the expected claiming age provides incomplete information on the 
respondents’ subjective probability distribution. It may well reflect the most likely 
outcome only, and probabilities may change without changing this most likely outcome.  
Another possibility is that the rounding to the nearest age in the question eliminates much 
of the variation that could be otherwise noted. By collecting better data on such 
expectations we could say more on how such expectations react to the change in 
incentives. 
       
6. Conclusions 
  The elimination of the earnings test on social security benefits after the normal 
retirement age has been used as a natural experiment in various studies on actual labor   23 
supply at an older age. In this study, we have focused on how this policy changes affects 
expectations of workers who have not yet reached an age at which they can claim old age 
social security benefits. We have presented a two period theoretical model, demonstrating 
that workers should react in different ways, depending on where they are on their budget 
set while the earnings test is still in place. This model also implies that the effects are 
smaller if workers realize that taxed away benefits will be returned in later years with 
actuarial adjustment. In that case, depending on the individual’s discount factor and the 
actuarial adjustment rate, it may even be the case that the earnings test is irrelevant. 
  The advantage of looking at expectations is that we can see how expectations of 
the same people develop over time. Moreover, since some groups were not affected by 
the earnings test in the first place, a control group is available Administrative social 
security records linked to the core HRS data allow us to distinguish the control group and 
several treatment groups in our data. Combining this with the time dimension allows for a 
difference in differences approach. We applied this both to the self-reported probability 
of working full-time after age 65 (the normal retirement age during the time period we 
consider), and to the self-reported expected claiming age. 
  For men, we find substantial effects of elimination of the earnings test that on the 
probability to work after the normal retirement age, and the qualitative effects are in line 
with the theoretical predictions under the assumption that people do not realize that 
benefits taxed away by the earnings test are returned later with actuarial adjustment, or 
under the assumption that people have large discount rates or face liquidity constraints so 
that they hardly account for the future consequences of their current decisions. For 
women, no clear effects of elimination of the earnings test are found, probably due to the 
relation between the effect of the earnings test on own benefits and changes in spousal 
benefits, relevant to a large fraction of women in the sample. The issue of spouse benefits 
is not dealt with in the current paper and is an issue of further research. 
  Neither for men, nor for women, significant effects on the expected claiming age 
are found. This is puzzling, since theoretical arguments would predict that effects on 
labor supply and retirement would be accompanied by changes in the expected claiming 
age. It casts some doubt on whether people choose their (expected) claiming age based on 
the economic trade-off between leisure and income. This is also an issue for further 
research.   24 
  The conclusion that people adjust their future work and retirement plans to the 
rules of the social security system is important for public policy. It also implies that 
people realize that the rules change, giving them at least a chance to reconsider their 
retirement savings and investment portfolio. On the other hand, the result that the 
adjustment of plans is largely based on misperception of the rules, ignoring the actuarial 
adjusted compensation in later years for benefits lost under the earnings test, is also 
relevant. It confirms that many people do not always base their expectations and 
decisions on fully rational economic optimization and suggests that providing 
information and keeping the rules simple and transparent is as important in formulating 
policy measures as incorporating the desired financial incentives.            25 
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Appendix A: Calculation of Survival Probabilities 
 
Using life tables 
To operationalize our adjustment of life-table survival probabilities, we start from 
a simple exponential hazard model widely used to approximate survival curves, the 
Gompertz hazard. We assume that life table mortality rates follow the specification 
0, 1, ( ) exp( ) L L L m a a κ κ = , where a is age and the parameters  0,L κ  and  1,L κ control the level 
and the slope of the log mortality rate. Using
0 ( ) exp( ( ) )
a
L L S a m s ds = −∫ , the probability to 
survive until at least age a is given by 
 
0,
1, 1, ( ) exp[ (1 exp( ))]
L
L L L S a a
κ
κ κ = − .  (8) 
Conditional on surviving up to age a, an individual has a probability to survive up 
to age s (s a > ) given by , ( ) ( )/ ( ) L a L L S s S s S a = . 
 
Using subjective probabilities 
The HRS asks age eligible respondents to report the probability they will survive 
up to age 75. Answers to such questions are known to include considerable measurement 
error, as well as focal responses (at 0, 50 and 100). Hence, estimation of individual 
survival curves is difficult (see Gan, Hurd and McFadden, 2003). We therefore prefer to 
estimate group level subjective survival curves. We define groups by age (2 year age 
categories), education level (less than 12 yrs, 12 yrs, more than 12 yrs) and health status 
(excellent /very good/good or fair/poor). We pool all waves (ignoring calendar time 
effects) and calculate the mean of the subjective probability responses within each age-
education-health cell. Hence, a respondent’s cell and reference subjective life-table can 
change over waves if the respondent changes group, e.g. due to deterioration of health or 
simply due to aging.  
In terms of the Gompertz model, the answers to the subjective probability 
question from age a to age 75 represent a point on the conditional subjective survival 









exp[ (1 exp( 75))]
(75)



















.  (9) 
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We impose that the baseline hazard across all groups is the same as the baseline 
hazard of the life-table ( 1, 1, j L κ κ = ).  This means we estimate the proportional change in 
the mortality hazard across groups but not the baseline hazard. The shape could be 
estimated using the probability question to age 85 or using the fact that the conditional 
survival curve is observed at different ages (from age 51 to 61). However, an analytical 
solution is difficult to obtain for the two parameters simultaneously.   
We can estimate  0, 1, , L L κ κ  from the life table mortality rates. We do this separately 
for men and women and for each year in the survey, using the yearly life-tables available 
at www.mortality.org  (based on Vital Statistics). We regress 
0, 1, log( ( )) log( ) L L L m a a u κ κ = + +  where u is an error term. Define the log ratio of the 






( ) log[ ] ( ( ) ( ))[ ]
( )
j a
j a L L j L
L a
S s
r s D s D a
S s





1, ( ) exp( (1 exp( )))
L L L D x x κ κ = − .  (11) 
 
This last term is “known” from estimation of the life-table parameters of the 
mortality hazard. 










d s d a
κ κ = +
−
,  (12) 
where  ( ) log( ( )) L L d x D x = . 
  The conditional subjective survival at each age for group j can be calculated from 
(9). These “corrections” adjust only for differences in the level of the log mortality 
hazard. Since this is probably the predominant difference in the underlying true hazard, 
this is likely to capture a considerable amount of differential mortality across groups.  
Table A.1 reports the distribution of survival probabilities for 55 year old male 
and female respondents in 1992. The table shows that there is serious underprediction of 
survival probabilities to age 75, particularly for females (cf. Hurd and McGarry, 1995). 
For males, underprediction is rather small (3%), compared to 12% for females.  
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 Table A.1 Survival Probabilities based on Life-Tables and Subjective Probabilities 
Conditional on Surviving to Age 55 
age life-table subjective Std. Min Max
Males
55 1 1 0 1 1
56 0.991 0.987 0.005 0.978 0.991
57 0.980 0.974 0.009 0.954 0.981
58 0.969 0.960 0.014 0.930 0.971
59 0.957 0.945 0.019 0.904 0.960
60 0.944 0.929 0.024 0.878 0.948
65 0.862 0.838 0.052 0.729 0.879
75 0.610 0.590 0.102 0.381 0.675
85 0.271 0.299 0.102 0.101 0.393
95 0.037 0.082 0.044 0.007 0.130
105 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.014
109 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
Females
55 1 1 0 1 1
56 0.995 0.990 0.003 0.982 0.993
57 0.989 0.979 0.007 0.964 0.985
58 0.982 0.967 0.011 0.944 0.977
59 0.975 0.955 0.015 0.923 0.968
60 0.967 0.942 0.019 0.901 0.958
65 0.918 0.863 0.042 0.774 0.900
75 0.751 0.633 0.091 0.444 0.717
85 0.457 0.334 0.102 0.134 0.438
95 0.111 0.092 0.048 0.010 0.151
105 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.015
109 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
Notes: Respondents aged 55 in 1992
conditional survival
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Appendix B: Calculation of Social Security Benefits 
 
We calculate the AIME of each respondent for each year in the survey as well as 
the projected AIME from ages 62 to 69. As for growth in future earnings, we use the 
growth in the Average National Wage Index. We take the last Social Security earnings in 
the SS.Er as the basis for computing each projection. This also assumes that the worker 
continues to work until the age at which we calculate the AIME. Hence, we adjust 
quarters of coverage accordingly so that an individual who is not eligible at age 55 but 
works until 62 could become eligible at age 62. In general workers are eligible if they 
accumulated more than 40 quarters of coverage (10 years where they accumulated 4 
credits from covered earnings). To calculate benefits, we use a formula constructed from 
the Social Security Handbook. We have done limited benchmark against the Social 
Security ANYPIA formula. Many parameters of the benefit formula are adjusted every 
year by SSA to reflect general changes in prices and cost-of-living. For years beyond 
2004, parameters of the formula such as bend points for computing the PIA, the exempt 
amount under the Earnings test, the maximum taxable earnings for Social Security are all 
updated using their average growth rate over the period 1985-2003. This is usually 
closely in line with the average national wage index. Hence, this implies that workers 
expect a change in those parameters which is consistent with previous recent changes to 
the benefit formula.  
We take into account the minimum PIA in case the worker’s PIA is too low. Upon 
calculating the PIA, the benefit is adjusted for early or late claiming using the Actuarial 
Reduction factor (ARF before NRA) and the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) that 
applies depending on the birth cohort. We implement the COLA adjustment which 
adjusts for inflation and cost-of-living increases. The average cost-of-living adjustment 
over the period 1985-2003 is used (2.9%). Finally, the earnings test is implemented using 
the rules in effect as outlined in Table 1.    31 
Appendix C: Complete Results Table 9 Males 











widow -7.776 -7.046 -0.373 0.039 0.515
(ref: married) 0.283 0.173 0.190 0.807 0.099
divorced -1.325 0.749 0.076 -0.013 0.026
0.673 0.741 0.589 0.856 0.872
never married 3.236 2.186 0.381 0.034 0.124
0.590 0.595 0.205 0.792 0.677
black -13.204 -10.960 -0.646 -0.313 -0.338
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093
other race 6.348 3.513 -0.156 0.147 0.257
0.216 0.377 0.538 0.202 0.327
years schooling 2.018 1.187 0.069 0.046 0.125
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
health good -8.429 -5.450 -0.189 -0.076 -0.090 -0.096
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.672 0.052 0.354
health fair/poor -4.853 -0.579 -0.004 -0.492 0.064 -0.040
0.240 0.844 0.984 0.101 0.550 0.859
self-employed 30.210 20.014 0.793 0.006 0.113 0.389
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.065 0.004
tenure current job -0.265 -0.240 -0.014 -0.036 -0.003 -0.009
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.110 0.047
pressure to retire -5.316 -4.501 -0.255 -0.369 -0.195 -0.037
< 65 from co-workers 0.070 0.024 0.014 0.114 0.004 0.810
transition less  5.463 2.041 0.105 -0.005 0.035 0.183
demanding job poss. 0.012 0.152 0.180 0.976 0.465 0.080
1st quntile wealth 17.377 13.610 0.394 0.561 0.266 0.366
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.111 0.000 0.024
2nd quntile wealth 6.348 5.738 0.083 -0.020 0.058 0.082
(ref: 3rd quintile) 0.025 0.002 0.437 0.938 0.360 0.556
4th quntile wealth -7.240 -3.284 -0.220 -0.239 -0.113 -0.239
0.009 0.075 0.033 0.335 0.064 0.080
5th quntile wealth -16.386 -9.125 -0.521 -0.681 -0.104 -0.208
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.110 0.150
has DB plan current  -14.619 -7.068 -0.170 -0.116 -0.186
job 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.021 0.100
has DC plan current 1.391 0.978 0.072 0.127 0.195
job 0.502 0.481 0.360 0.006 0.054
total HH income 1.145E-05 9.023E-06 1.862E-06 0.000 2.998E-07 1.663E-07
0.015 0.003 0.000 0.063 0.008 0.412
Social Security wealth 3.657E-04 3.176E-04 1.034E-05 8.626E-06 7.048E-06
age 62 - subjective 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.059
SS accrual age 62 0.760 0.641 0.072 -0.020 0.009
(%) - subjective 0.001 0.001 0.054 0.339 0.574
Current AIME -0.013 -0.011 -3.713E-04 -2.895E-04 -1.733E-04
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.171
t=1998 3.959 2.181 0.104 0.036 -0.034 0.206
(ref: t=1996) 0.099 0.133 0.172 0.862 0.516 0.066
1-50% of P -6.776 0.059 -0.097 -0.055 -0.064
Control is no tax -4.705 -4.057 -0.105 -0.160 -0.108
51-99% of P 0.187 0.098 0.518 0.054 0.559
-14.991 -12.723 -0.286 -0.262 -0.486
100% if P 0.001 0.000 0.164 0.012 0.031
-9.426 -7.732 -0.408 -0.003 0.201
repeal (REP=1) 0.079 0.045 0.111 -0.132 0.982 0.431
Control is no tax 1.963 1.253 0.114 0.773 -0.161 0.383
1-50% of P X REP 0.640 0.632 0.437 0.783 0.098 0.049
9.927 5.944 0.448 0.023 0.047 -0.090
51-99% of P X REP 0.053 0.058 0.010 0.233 0.688 0.698
10.388 7.505 0.229 0.475 0.113 0.217
100% of P X REP 0.040 0.015 0.169 0.184 0.329 0.342
-4.431 3.033 0.018 0.744 -0.059 -0.375
constant -24.851 -2.351 -0.880 -4.295
0.004 0.697 0.015 0.000
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 4146 4146 4146 1166 3791 3791
rho (share UH) 0.590 0.666 0.462
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective probability to work
full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security Benefits. 
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Appendix C Complete Results Table 9 Females (Not Intended for Publication) 











widow 13.594 11.553 0.342 -0.058 -0.357
(ref: married) 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.442 0.072
divorced 19.702 15.184 0.541 0.241 0.207
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086
never married 9.570 8.803 0.331 0.021 -0.073
0.060 0.029 0.129 0.850 0.775
black -12.847 -10.125 -0.333 -0.251 -0.387
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.014
other race -3.127 -2.927 -0.001 0.239 0.114
0.548 0.480 0.997 0.030 0.664
years schooling 3.211 2.556 0.112 0.054 0.111
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
health good -4.291 -2.303 -0.107 -0.195 -0.039 0.009
0.029 0.107 0.106 0.218 0.372 0.920
health fair/poor -7.728 -4.824 -0.281 -0.400 0.117 -0.128
0.017 0.047 0.014 0.101 0.122 0.456
self-employed 24.386 17.424 0.632 0.696 0.175 0.281
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.006 0.036
tenure current job -0.496 -0.414 -0.016 -0.031 -0.004 -0.006
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.102 0.226
pressure to retire -6.134 -1.982 -0.044 0.254 -0.182 -0.236
< 65 from co-workers 0.042 0.364 0.644 0.187 0.008 0.139
transition less  5.961 3.515 0.095 -0.057 0.184 0.337
demanding job poss. 0.003 0.014 0.148 0.690 0.000 0.000
1st quntile wealth 12.048 8.666 0.241 0.123 0.186 0.192
0.000 0.000 0.030 0.681 0.007 0.187
2nd quntile wealth 7.182 3.564 0.119 -0.093 0.071 0.012
(ref: 3rd quintile) 0.006 0.059 0.172 0.630 0.229 0.922
4th quntile wealth -9.005 -6.605 -0.241 -0.174 -0.060 -0.145
0.001 0.000 0.005 0.408 0.307 0.229
5th quntile wealth -16.844 -11.380 -0.334 0.278 -0.130 -0.186
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.323 0.042 0.160
has DB plan current  -11.278 -6.832 -0.207 -0.173 -0.336
job 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001
has DC plan current 6.234 2.968 0.085 0.056 -0.009
job 0.002 0.037 0.202 0.208 0.920
total HH income 1.29E-06 -1.95E-06 3.62E-09 0.000 3.18E-07 2.34E-07
0.837 0.657 0.987 0.984 0.009 0.162
Social Security wealth 1.46E-04 1.25E-04 3.45E-06 8.69E-06 7.35E-06
age 62 - subjective 0.014 0.008 0.154 0.000 0.018
SS accrual age 62 0.226 0.167 0.004 0.004 0.010
(%) - subjective 0.089 0.112 0.485 0.210 0.148
Current AIME -0.006 -0.005 -1.54E-04 -3.56E-04 -2.56E-04
0.023 0.009 0.141 0.000 0.041
t=1998 -0.379 -0.810 0.118 0.015 -0.153 0.017
(ref: t=1996) 0.868 0.586 0.059 0.925 0.002 0.865
1-50% of P 1.154 0.478 0.114 -0.181 -0.168
Control is no tax 0.706 0.836 0.338 0.008 0.289
51-99% of P 4.066 2.989 0.296 -0.077 0.154
0.352 0.368 0.091 0.421 0.472
100% if P 6.894 6.197 0.579 -0.121 0.034
0.380 0.280 0.071 0.468 0.920
repeal (REP=1) 8.225 4.630 0.326 0.005 -0.291 0.195
Control is no tax 0.007 0.026 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.171
1-50% of P X REP 1.810 2.394 0.127 0.334 0.126 0.101
0.644 0.360 0.264 0.127 0.167 0.571
51-99% of P X REP 0.458 1.956 0.066 0.139 0.074 -0.171
0.925 0.550 0.647 0.604 0.496 0.388
100% of P X REP -6.206 -2.709 -0.365 -0.890 -0.225 -0.164
0.617 0.736 0.339 0.247 0.396 0.702
constant -47.681 -26.799 -1.633 -4.022
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5306 5306 5306 1745 4363 4363
rho (share UH) 0.447 0.632 0.439
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective probability to work
full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security Benefits. 
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Appendix C (Continuted) Results P62 (Not Intented for Publication) 
 
Males tobit P62 RE tobit P62
RE probit 
(P62>0)
repeal (REP=1) 4.596 2.756 0.273
Control is no tax (0.332) (0.364) (0.065)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 1.193 0.453 0.031
(0.837) (0.901) (0.863)
51-99% of P 2.798 1.536 0.007
(0.622) (0.665) (0.968)
100% if P -6.703 5.022 -0.392
(0.536) (0.458) (0.237)
N 4146 4146 4146
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates.
P62 is the subjective probability to work full-time past 62. 
 
 
Females tobit P62 RE tobit P62
RE probit 
(P62>0)
repeal (REP=1) 5.773 2.757 0.316
Control is no tax (0.083) (0.213) (0.001)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 0.407 1.022 0.069
(0.924) (0.713) (0.563)
51-99% of P -1.198 1.328 -0.143
(0.824) (0.706) (0.350)
100% if P -10.449 -3.615 -0.069
(0.448) (0.684) (0.867)
N 5306 5306 5306
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P62
is the subjective probability to work full-time past 62. 
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Table 1 Parameters of the Earnings Test and Actuarial Adjustment 1992-2004 
for those reaching the NRA in 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
NRA 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 4mo
7,440  8,040  8,280  9,120  10,080  11,280  11,640 
10,200  11,160  12,500  14,500  None None None
50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
33% 33% 33% 33% 0% 0% 0%
6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%
4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0%
Actuarial Reduction Factor (before 
NRA)
Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
(after NRA)
Notes: Earnings limit defined in rule §1803.2 of the Social Security Handbook 2004. Normal retirement age defined in §723.5. 
Delayed retirement credit §720.3. §724.1 defines the actuarial reduction factor.
Earnings Limit before NRA





Table 2 HRS design  
Birth year DRC NRA 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 HRS cohort
1918 3.50% 65 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
1919 3.50% 65 73 75 77 79 81 83 85
1920 3.50% 65 72 74 76 78 80 82 84
1921 3.50% 65 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
1922 3.50% 65 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
1923 3.50% 65 69 71 73 75 77 79 81
1924 3.50% 65 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
1925 3.50% 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79
1926 3.50% 65 66 68 70 72 74 76 78
1927 4.00% 65 65 67 69 71 73 75 77
1928 4.00% 65 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
1929 4.50% 65 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
1930 4.50% 65 62 64 66 68 70 72 74
1931 5.00% 65 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
1932 5.00% 65 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
1933 5.50% 65 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
1934 5.50% 65 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
1935 6.00% 65 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
1936 6.00% 65 56 58 60 62 64 66 68
1937 6.50% 65 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
1938 6.50% 65.02 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
1939 7.00% 65.04 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
1940 7.00% 65.06 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
1941 7.50% 65.08 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
1942 7.50% 66 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
1943 8.00% 66 49 51 53 55 57 59 61
1944 8.00% 66 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
1945 8.00% 66 47 49 51 53 55 57 59
1946 8.00% 66 46 48 50 52 54 56 58
1947 8.00% 66 45 47 49 51 53 55 57
1948 8.00% 66 44 46 48 50 52 54 56
1949 8.00% 66 43 45 47 49 51 53 55
1950 8.00% 66 42 44 46 48 50 52 54
1951 8.00% 66 41 43 45 47 49 51 53
1951 8.00% 66 41 43 45 47 49 51 52
1952 8.00% 66 40 42 44 46 48 50 51
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Table 3: Sample of Workers aged 51-61 
age
all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er
50 378 293 146 115 104 74 233 139 106 62 48 24 235 27
51 708 555 212 169 109 72 418 234 136 69 56 30 408 23
52 685 500 393 306 136 102 343 197 261 142 103 54 483 29
53 704 520 641 500 199 163 346 201 400 227 119 56 417 25
54 622 466 600 456 373 286 359 227 293 173 215 115 395 50
55 628 470 605 463 555 426 417 279 297 185 374 214 404 59
56 592 439 532 411 540 409 532 369 325 207 267 160 352 106
57 584 444 497 393 570 438 562 431 380 245 282 161 347 203
58 524 390 528 402 474 375 487 365 442 334 280 167 254 142
59 484 375 500 392 480 378 507 391 490 374 320 216 250 151
60 486 372 415 310 453 334 448 337 425 319 380 267 273 166
61 350 269 374 299 422 331 411 311 418 321 423 329 277 187
Total 6,745 5,093 5,443 4,216 4,415 3,388 5,063 3,481 3,973 2,658 2,867 1,793 4,095 1,168




Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Age 51-61 
 
All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er
demographics (Mean)
age 55.9 55.9 56.7 56.8 56.0 56.3 56.5 56.9 57.1 57.5 55.1 57.6
widow 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06
sep(or)div 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11
never married 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
black 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.11
other race 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.03
school yrs 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.7 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.4
health good 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33
health fair/poor 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14
Job Characteristics (Mean)
self-employed 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17
tenure (yrs) 13.6 13.5 13.3 13.2 13.5 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.2 13.3 12.7 12.9
pressured to retire <65 
by co-workers
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
transition low 
demanding job easy
0.00 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29
total fin. wealth 144,621 141,863 145,532 144,943 141,131 140,550 153,932 154,482 159,973 154,710 161,000 170,500
liquid fin. wealth 19,169 19,164 18,704 18,885 18,585 17,424 24,739 26,388 28,416 26,311 14,000 22,000
Total HH Income 58,257 58,768 62,267 61,785 63,886 63,422 66,230 65,784 66,856 65,252 68,024 64,760
Current AIME 2,018 2,045 2,273 2,367 2,370 2,304
% with pension plan 0.567 0.575 0.569 0.575 0.587 0.594 0.611 0.620 0.590 0.592 0.590 0.588
% with DC Plan 0.270 0.281 0.305 0.314 0.361 0.366 0.360 0.369 0.359 0.366 0.411 0.388
% with DB Plan 0.370 0.373 0.343 0.344 0.338 0.343 0.330 0.336 0.314 0.311 0.296 0.312
2004
Notes: Variable definitions in Appendix . All statistics are unweighted. Dollar amounts converted to $2004 using the BLS consumer 
price index.
Median wealth and earnings (USD 2004)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
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age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 27.26 26.88 24.81 30.16 31.24 29.43
0.52 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.69 0.71
55-57 31.96 26.13 27.63 29.62 32.36 28.94
0.56 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.68
58-61 30.01 29.13 30.77 29.04 32.11 32.51
0.54 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.66
Total 29.32 27.45 28.79 29.50 31.98 31.20
0.53 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.64 0.67
mean and %>66
age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 63.46 63.45 63.64 63.83 64.41 64.26
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.09
55-57 63.42 63.38 63.55 63.86 63.82 64.14
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.11
58-61 63.65 63.46 63.72 63.64 63.70 64.00
0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11
Total 63.50 63.43 63.64 63.76 63.87 64.07
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11
Notes: mean (including zeros) and % larger than 0 for each year and age 
group. Workers aged 51-61.
Age Expect to Claim Social Security Benefits by year




age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 22.14 19.78 20.80 23.21 24.86 22.91
0.46 0.49 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.59
55-57 20.51 20.91 25.78 22.82 25.69 27.35
0.42 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.62
58-61 22.65 20.92 23.35 23.88 28.75 28.02
0.43 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.58
Total 21.85 20.45 23.41 23.33 26.78 26.77
0.443 0.469 0.477 0.516 0.573 0.596
mean and %>66
age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 63.41 63.44 63.69 63.83 64.09 64.18
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.15
55-57 63.45 63.35 63.74 63.71 63.65 64.34
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.14
58-61 63.61 63.56 63.69 63.72 63.94 63.69
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Total 63.47 63.45 63.71 63.75 63.91 64.00
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11
probability work at 65 by year 
Age Expect to Claim Social Security Benefits by year
Notes: mean (including zeros) and % larger than 0 for each year and age 
group. Workers aged 51-61.   
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Table 6a: Expected Social Security Wealth and Incentives to Claim Social Security 
Benefits for those aged 51-61 from 1992 to 2004: Males 
using life-table mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 90,157 0.503 0.42 -0.39 -1.13 -2.55 -3.09 -3.58 -4.07
25th 135,609 0.757 0.72 -0.09 -0.83 -1.71 -2.34 -2.91 -3.48
Median 179,091 1.000 1.32 0.48 -0.30 -1.03 -1.65 -2.27 -2.88
75th 213,326 1.191 1.81 0.91 0.10 -0.46 -0.77 -1.52 -2.21
90th 233,987 1.307 2.59 1.64 0.80 0.11 0.06 -0.72 -1.46
using subjective mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 87,043 0.485 -0.04 -0.99 -1.86 -3.01 -3.45 -4.04 -4.64
25th 129,972 0.724 0.81 0.01 -0.70 -1.76 -2.27 -2.78 -3.28
Median 179,536 1.000 1.47 0.65 -0.09 -0.79 -1.33 -1.90 -2.45
75th 219,491 1.223 2.09 1.27 0.54 -0.10 -0.40 -1.06 -1.65
90th 245,663 1.368 2.85 1.95 1.16 0.57 0.39 -0.31 -0.97
accrual (% of W62)
accrual (% of W62)
Notes: median social security wealth at 62 for the sample aged 51-61 between 1992 and 2004. 
Expressed in $2004 USD. The accrual at age a is defined in terms of the % difference between 
the expected present value of social security wealth if claimed at a+1 compared to age a. 
 
Table 6b: Expected Social Security Wealth and Incentives to Claim Social Secutity 
Benefits for those aged 51-61 from 1992 to 2004: Females 
using life-table mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 37,432 0.209 1.65 0.87 0.18 -0.34 -0.96 -1.54 -2.05
25th 85,422 0.477 2.52 1.67 0.93 0.21 -0.16 -0.75 -1.31
Median 119,872 0.669 3.55 2.67 1.88 1.09 0.83 0.17 -0.46
75th 162,557 0.908 4.53 3.66 2.88 2.15 1.83 1.12 0.45
90th 213,007 1.189 5.82 4.91 4.07 3.35 3.22 2.47 1.84
using subjective mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 33,575 0.187 0.89 0.02 -0.74 -1.77 -2.25 -2.83 -3.45
25th 74,172 0.413 1.73 0.88 0.13 -0.59 -1.06 -1.68 -2.26
Median 108,499 0.604 2.84 1.95 1.15 0.42 0.16 -0.51 -1.14
75th 150,337 0.837 4.00 3.12 2.33 1.57 1.31 0.58 -0.08
90th 201,923 1.125 5.28 4.36 3.56 2.88 2.69 1.97 1.33
accrual (% of W62)
accrual (% of W62)
Notes: median social security wealth at 62 for the sample aged 51-61 between 1992 and 2004. 
Expressed in $2004 USD. The accrual at age a is defined in terms of the % difference between 
the expected present value of social security wealth if claimed at a+1 compared to age a. 
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Table 7a: Projected Loss from the Earnings Test before 2000: Males 
 
quantile myopic  life-table subjective myopic  life-table subjective
Loss in dollars
10th 0 0 0 0 0 0
25th 3,003 868 832 0 0 0
50th 12,020 3,485 3,010 6,913 1,549 1,114
75th 15,300 4,387 3,698 15,486 3,473 2,785
90th 16,856 4,758 4,336 21,201 5,451 4,727
as fraction of earnings (positive earnings)
10th 0 0 0 0 0 0
25th 0.193 0.055 0.043 0.091 0.016 0.005
50th 0.239 0.069 0.059 0.191 0.039 0.030
75th 0.292 0.084 0.080 0.233 0.062 0.055
90th 0.327 0.095 0.098 0.251 0.077 0.075
as fraction of current liquid assets (positive assets)
10th -0.571 -0.162 -0.159 -0.289 -0.064 -0.052
25th 0 0 0 0 0 0
50th 0.087 0.025 0.021 0.057 0.013 0.008
75th 0.439 0.127 0.115 0.310 0.075 0.059
90th 2.128 0.603 0.555 1.404 0.347 0.292
forward-looking using forward-looking using
Notes: workers aged 51-61 interviewed before 2000. 
Predicted Loss due to the earnings test
age 62 normal retirement age
 
 
Table 7b: Projected Loss from the Earnings Test before 2000: Females 
quantile myopic  life-table subjective myopic  life-table subjective
Loss in dollars
10th 0 0 0 0 -174 0
25th 0 0 0 0 0 0
50th 4,852 727 1,095 575 0 0
75th 9,463 1,413 2,067 5,811 448 750
90th 12,882 1,895 2,720 11,730 1,311 1,940
as fraction of earnings (positive earnings)
10th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 -0.007 -0.001
25th 0.077 0.009 0.018 0 0 0
50th 0.216 0.031 0.041 0.076 0 0.002
75th 0.264 0.039 0.060 0.170 0.017 0.026
90th 0.294 0.045 0.077 0.217 0.035 0.049
as fraction of current liquid assets (positive assets)
10th -0.318 -0.047 -0.076 -0.01061 -0.01384 -0.0127036
25th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
50th 0.022 0.003 0.005 0 0 0
75th 0.240 0.035 0.052 0.100528 0.007395 0.0118125
90th 1.338 0.195 0.320 0.612906 0.062906 0.0946192
Predicted Loss due to the earnings test
Notes: workers aged 51-61 interviewed before 2000. 
age 62 normal retirement age
forward-looking using forward-looking using
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Table 8: Unconditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates  
Myopic loss
% of benefit at NRA
Group 1998 2002 Diff 2002-1998 1998 2002 Diff 2002-1998
0 36.30 36.08 -0.22 25.57 27.49 1.92
1 to 49% 34.48 37.24 2.76 24.88 27.34 2.46
50 to 99% 26.26 27.40 1.14 25.06 29.13 4.07
100% 31.32 31.58 0.26 35.59 42.35 6.76
Group
0 65.91 65.15 -0.76 53.36 55.37 2.01
1 to 49% 65.50 72.49 6.99 57.91 61.39 3.49
50 to 99% 67.46 68.25 0.79 56.15 65.24 9.09
100% 73.68 73.68 0.00 64.71 70.59 5.88
Group
0 8.20 13.11 4.92 6.59 9.52 2.93
1 to 49% 7.02 7.46 0.44 6.61 7.76 1.15
50 to 99% 7.93 9.66 1.72 11.70 13.83 2.13
100% 12.90 16.13 3.23 25.00 15.00 -10.00
Females Males
%EC>NRA (N=829)
 Males:  mean P65 (N=875)
% P65>0 (N=875)
 mean P65 (N=632)
% P65>0 (N=632)
%EC>NRA (N=671)
Notes: Sample of workers 51-61 who report in both waves.   
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Table 9a: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates for Males 











repeal (REP=1) 1.963 1.253 0.114 -0.132 -0.161 0.383
Control is no tax (0.640) (0.632) (0.437) (0.773) (0.098) (0.049)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 9.927 5.944 0.448 0.783 0.047 -0.090
(0.053) (0.058) (0.010) (0.023) (0.688) (0.698)
51-99% of P 10.388 7.505 0.229 0.233 0.113 0.217
(0.040) (0.015) (0.169) (0.475) (0.329) (0.342)
100% if P -4.431 3.033 0.018 0.184 -0.059 -0.375
(0.638) (0.601) (0.954) (0.744) (0.768) (0.314)
N 4146 4146 4146 1166 3791 3791
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective probability to work
full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security Benefits. REP is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 for 2000 and 2002 observations. The grouping is done by the share of benefits loss at NRA. Controls for age
dummies, demographics, job characteristics, current financial resources and projected social security wealth and accrual at age 62 as
well as AIME. Full results in Appendix.
 
Table 9b: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates for Females 











repeal (REP=1) 8.225 4.630 0.326 0.005 -0.291 0.195
Control is no tax (0.007) (0.026) (0.000) (0.987) (0.000) (0.171)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 1.810 2.394 0.127 0.334 0.126 0.101
(0.644) (0.360) (0.264) (0.127) (0.167) (0.571)
51-99% of P 0.458 1.956 0.066 0.139 0.074 -0.171
(0.925) (0.550) (0.647) (0.604) (0.496) (0.388)
100% if P -6.206 -2.709 -0.365 -0.890 -0.225 -0.164
(0.617) (0.736) (0.339) (0.247) (0.396) (0.702)
N 5306 5306 5306 1745 4363 4363
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective probability to work
full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security Benefits. REP is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 for 2000 and 2002 observations. The grouping is done by the share of benefits loss at NRA. Controls for age
dummies, demographics, job characteristics, current financial resources and projected social security wealth and accrual at age 62 as
well as AIME. Full results in Appendix.
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Table 10 Actual Claiming Decisions and Differences between Actual and Expected 
Claiming Age 
mean deviation Diff Diff
N 1998 2000 2000-1998 1998 2000 2000-1998
gender
female 0.086 -0.451 -0.537 0.800 0.837 0.037
70 73 70 73
male 0.430 -0.433 -0.863 0.701 0.832 0.131
93 90 93 90
fraction benefit loss 





0 -0.200 -0.154 0.046 0.862 0.862 0.000
35 39 35 39
1-50% -0.222 -0.225 -0.003 0.781 0.880 0.099
45 40 45 40
51-99% 0.487 0.029 -0.458 0.712 0.795 0.084
39 35 39 35
100% -0.222 -0.779 -0.557 0.571 0.840 0.269
18 18 18 18
turning 65 in turning 65 in
Deviation claim at NRA
Notes: sample of respondents who turn 65 in given wave, have not claimed before 65 and will not claim after age 69 (for deviations). 
The variable in the deviation is the difference between the age at which benefits were claimed and the age at which the respondent 
expected to claim as of previous wave. For the second panel, the fraction of respondents turning 65 and claiming is presented.  
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